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Entrepreneurship in Georgia
Philippe Rudaz
Abstract
Georgia has received a fair amount of publicity as a potential investment destination in recent years. The 
country won praise for its bold approach to reforms and economic policy. While it is true that Georgia made 
tremendous progress on issues like corruption, our examination of the structure of small and mid-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) revealed that they face many serious problems that are not yet addressed by the government. 
There are also a stunning number of self-employed persons, not observed by official statistics, many of whom 
could be described as “entrepreneur by default” as opposed to “entrepreneur by choice”. These measurement 
issues show that the notion of “entrepreneurship” should be considered carefully, especially in former Soviet 
economies like Georgia, and force observers to ask where entrepreneurship actually begins.
Introduction
Entrepreneurship is as much a social phenomenon as 
an economic one and as such, the shape entrepreneur-
ship takes in Georgia opens the door to a wide range of 
complex issues that transition economies have to tackle. 
In 2010 The Economist concluded: “Today Georgia has 
reinvented itself as the star of the Caucasus. It is less cor-
rupt than most former Soviet republics and one of the 
easiest places in the world to do business, according to 
the World Bank. Its liberalized economy has weathered 
Russian embargoes, and the state held together during 
the war with Russia. Its police do not take bribes and 
electricity is no longer a luxury. Most important, peo-
ple are no longer surprised by such success. The biggest 
transformation is in their minds.” While one has to 
acknowledge that Georgian authorities took bold steps 
to fight corruption and gave economic policies a clear 
neo-liberal direction, it is nonetheless crucial to take a 
critical approach to the claims that Georgia has made 
about its success in facilitating entrepreneurial endeav-
ors. The methodology used by the World Bank for its 
“ease of doing business indicators” (EDBI) is highly con-
troversial and Georgia’s rise on the ranking took place 
against the background of important political concerns. 
To see beyond the facade, one has to look closer at the 
structure of the private sector.
From the regulatory, and in consequence statistical, 
perspective, Georgia’s economy consists of two differ-
ent components: The “observed” economy is described 
by statistics and regulated by informed bureaucrats, 
while the “unobserved” economy functions beyond the 
bounds of any regulations (such as requirements to reg-
ister, observe the labor code, pay taxes, or report perfor-
mance statistics) and therefore falls outside of national 
statistical instruments. In terms of occupational statis-
tics, the persons active in the unobserved part of Geor-
gia’s economy are defined as “self-employed.” Little is 
known about the mode of activity of the self-employed 
except that they live mainly in rural areas and that 
some may de facto run micro-enterprises. The work-
force amounts to 1.9 million people, but only 20 per-
cent is hired by the private sector and 12 percent by the 
public sector. With 16 percent of the workforce being 
unemployed, that leaves about half the total workforce 
as self-employed. Barely anything can be found about 
this portion of the Georgian economy in statistics. Yet 
self-employment amounts to about two-thirds of the 
total employment and, according to our estimates, gen-
erates about 18 percent of GDP.
These sharp employment differences within the 
population underline the sometimes overlooked side of 
entrepreneurship: “entrepreneurship for survival”. This 
form of entrepreneurship is a poverty-related and social 
policy issue. On one hand, it can be considered as mas-
sive unemployment, which harms the economic base of 
the country and is the reason Fitch Ratings estimated 
that Georgia has a middle level of income and a nar-
row economic base (EPRC, 2009:8). Indeed the stag-
gering figure of 1.9 million self-employed individuals 
explains the narrow base of the Georgian economy and 
its low level of labor productivity. Moreover, more than 
800,000 of the so called self-employed (81 percent) live 
in rural areas.
Thus, Georgia’s case illustrates very well the two-
sided coin characteristic of “entrepreneurship”. In other 
words, on one side, the unemployment point of view is 
linked to social policy. The average monthly income for 
Georgia is US$175 and about 41 percent of households 
were poor in 2009, if the minimum subsistence level 
is used as the poverty line (Gugushvili, 2011). On the 
other side, half of the economy relies on “entrepreneurs”, 
and that is an economic policy concern. Moreover this 
combined perspective on the GDP structure allows us to 
deduce that self-employment generates about 18 percent 
of the GDP. Interestingly, we find the two sided coin 
problem at the heart of the definition of a self-employed 
person given by Geostat: It can either be equated with 
“entrepreneurship” or survival.
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Structure of the SME Population
It is crucial to acknowledge the difficulty in defining 
the economic reality of small and mid-sized enterprises, 
which boils down to the question of where does “entre-
preneurship” begin. Georgian statistics, for example, do 
not distinguish between micro- and small enterprises 
even though the tax code does so and in contrast to 
the other South Caucasus countries. Moreover, what is 
considered a firm differs from institution to institution.
• The Ministry of Finance, which prepares the Geor-
gian tax code, recognizes micro-business as those 
with an annual turnover below GEL 30,000 (approx. 
18,000 USD) and small business as those with less 
than GEL 100,000 (approx. USD 60,000) annual 
turnover. From a tax perspective, micro-firms, which 
are not taxed, do not matter. Entrepreneurial activ-
ity begins with small firms, taxed up to 5 percent. 
There is no definition for medium firms.
• For GeoStat, the national statistics office, small firms 
are those that employ less than 20 persons with an 
annual turnover of less than GEL 500,000 (approx. 
USD 300,000). Medium enterprises are those with 
less than 100 persons generating a turnover of less 
than GEL 1,500,000 (approx. USD 900,000). Any-
thing above that standard, in persons and turnover 
is considered a large enterprise.
• Commercial banks have their own standards: TBC 
for example does not differentiate between small and 
medium and considers SMEs as enterprises with an 
annual turnover of less than GEL 8 million and lia-
bilities of USD 1.5 million.
Looking at the structure of enterprises, four disparities 
can be observed (see data p.  6 and p. 7).
1. The evidence of geographical disparity is given by 
the concentration of enterprises in Tbilisi. 45 per-
cent of companies are registered in Tbilisi and they 
generate 73 percent of the country’s turnover. There 
is a strong rural/urban dichotomy.
2. The disparity between the performance and employ-
ment levels of SMEs. SMEs contribute only 6 per-
cent of the GDP, but amount to 43 percent of the 
private sector in terms of employment.
3. The disparity between the types of activity contrib-
uting to GDP. On the one hand, 22 percent of the 
GDP is generated by three activities in the enterprise 
sector: Industry, wholesale and retail trade (includ-
ing repair of motor vehicles and personal household 
goods), and transport and communication. These 
activities constitute 70 percent of all the firms’ activ-
ities. We can only guess that the self-employed layer, 
which by deduction, contributes approximately 18 
percent of the GDP, includes farmers producing agri-
cultural goods for subsistence living in rural areas 
(81 percent of the self-employed live in rural areas) 
and people engaged in trade in cities.
Economic Policies for SMEs in Georgia
Economic policies targeted at SMEs can be viewed in 
two blocks: before and after 2006. The institutional and 
legal framework for SMEs started to be formed in the 
1990s. The “Small Enterprise Support” Special Law of 
1999 defined the key parameters for SME support. To 
implement these programs, the Center for Small Enter-
prise Development and Assistance and the Small Enter-
prise Coordination Council were created. Even though 
the development of the SME sector started steadily and 
efficiently, it was hindered in the early 2000s by high 
corruption, an unfavorable tax regime, and the bud-
get deficit. In other words, economic policy took into 
account the specifics of SMEs, but the institutional envi-
ronment was not business friendly. The exact opposite 
phenomenon took place after 2006. Georgia embarked 
then on radical reforms to change the economic envi-
ronment and as a result developed several measures that 
made entrepreneurial activities easier to undertake. By 
the same token, the level of corruption went down as 
well. The new course of economic policy, heavily influ-
enced by neoliberalism, eliminated government inter-
ference in the economic sphere and abolished the law 
on “Small and Medium Enterprise Support” in 2006. 
As a result, two laws now govern SME activities. The 
Law on the Georgian National Investment Agency, on 
which GeoStat bases its definition, and the Tax Code, 
which uses a different definition.
The move toward neoliberalism shifted the focus 
toward the overall business environment thus resulting 
in economic reforms and a redesign of economic policy 
making. Support for SMEs is therefore not considered 
as an important element of the economic framework, 
which would deserve specific attention at the policy level, 
because the rationale is to support the economic environ-
ment in general, but not one group in particular. Thus 
the two considerations related to entrepreneurship—the 
poverty motive and the entrepreneurial motive—are dif-
ficult to reconcile in Georgia. The absence of a general 
non-taxed minimum amount of income, which is excep-
tional by international standards, does not address the 
poverty issue. Yet, the entrepreneurial motive is treated 
only partially by the tax code (Christie, 2008).
During the last 12 years the performance of SMEs 
has dropped, in terms of employment, turnover and 
share of overall production. The Russian embargo, the 
2008 war and the global financial crisis all had an impact 
on this performance. However, one has to note that the 
neo-liberal policy eliminated all the SME laws, accom-
panying legislative acts and administrative mechanisms 
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for SME promotion and that probably had an impact 
too (Japaridze, 2011). The gap between the reality of the 
socio-economic fabric in Georgia and the economic pol-
icy of its government reflects the dilemma of economic 
reforms in transition. The imperative of reform demands 
non-interference with the economy and therefore does 
not favor any particular actors, but this policy prevents 
the development of SMEs.
Business Environment Measures: Tactic vs 
Strategy
The “policy vacuum” created by the retreat of the gov-
ernment gave rise to numerous measures and devel-
opment projects sponsored by national and interna-
tional agencies and NGOs. These measures significantly 
enhanced the business environment, but they are of a 
tactical nature and cannot replace strategic and com-
prehensive economic policies. Liberalization and the 
streamlining of bureaucratic procedures lightened the 
administrative burden of companies. Georgia success-
fully implemented and enforced anti-corruption laws. 
The Graft Index, reflecting the number of times firms 
were asked or expected to pay bribes to officials, is half 
the level found in Eastern and Central Asia. Georgia 
appears to provide better infrastructure (in terms of 
infrastructure service delays, water and electricity pro-
vision) than its counterparts (IFC, 2008). Public-Pri-
vate Consultations (PPC) emerged and the quality of 
the dialogue improved. Business incubator projects and 
support units, financed by donor organizations, do exist. 
Access to capital is now easier, but the progress is mostly 
visible for big companies.
The Georgian government reviewed and simplified 
some procedures: Georgian State Procurement functions 
electronically, which adds transparency and makes the 
process more participatory. It reformed and digitized 
the cadastre system and implemented e-government/
governance measures, whereby taxpayers may fill out 
their application online or communicate with authori-
ties electronically. However, our interviews revealed that 
approximately 90 percent of land ownership in rural 
areas is still unregistered.
As a result of these reforms, Georgia’s rise in the 
ranking of the World Bank’s EDBI indicators is unprec-
edented. A USAID report (USAID, 2009) notes that the 
result of these fast, broad and deep reforms of the busi-
ness climate in Georgia is that it is now considered an 
investment destination. According to the EDBI, Geor-
gia is ahead of France, Germany, and the Netherlands 
when it comes to the “ease of doing business”. This points 
to a familiar story in emergent countries where admin-
istrative barriers for local business have been simplified, 
but where the overall basic institutional framework is 
still fragile and the social (informal) barriers are still in 
place. Even though Georgia has undergone reforms of 
unprecedented breath and facilitates local business activ-
ities, its market institutions are still weak.
Thus there are still three areas of reform the country 
needs to address if it wants to attract international invest-
ment: Inadequate protection for property rights, low lev-
els of judicial independence and rule of law, and a strict 
system of tax and customs penalties, which appears to 
distort business decision-making and artificially encour-
age imports over local production. These areas of weak-
nesses require more than minor technical fixes. They 
represent basic institutional pillars on which market 
economies rest and grow.
Thus it seems that Georgia demonstrates a perfect 
case of governance indicators’ abuse (Arndt and Oman, 
2006). The ranking was used to propel the country from 
one with a reputation as a post-Soviet failed state to one 
known as a “frontier-market” and this marketing cam-
paign allowed Georgia to attract foreign investments. 
Its first offering of sovereign debt was a success, secur-
ing a 7.5 percent fixed interest rate which was three time 
oversubscribed and a B+ rating from Standard & Poor’s. 
“Such events marked Georgia’s transformation from a 
failed state to a neoliberal vanguard state at the leading 
edge of capital market expansion into the periphery of 
the global economy” (Schueth, 2011).
Constraints to SMEs Growth
Georgia’s SME face a variety of constraints:
Institutional constraints: Many barriers to SME 
growth still remain. Access to finance is for SMEs in 
Georgia, as elsewhere, problematic. The interviews we 
conducted revealed, for example, that there is a law giv-
ing tax authorities the right to use the collateral of tax 
payers who owe money to fiscal authorities. Unsurpris-
ingly, this provision has made banks reluctant to accept 
such collateral from SMEs. Similarly, the inefficiency of 
the bankruptcy law influences the banking sector’s will-
ingness to lend. Also, the absence of a specific arbitrage 
court makes it harder for business to operate. SMEs do 
not tend to think judicial procedures will turn out in 
their favor and thus prefer not to use judicial channels 
to resolve whatever commercial conflict they might have.
The trust component of the Georgian economic sec-
tor (interpersonal or institutional) should not be forgot-
ten. It is very hard to isolate that element to determine its 
influence on access to finance and relationships within 
the business sector. It is nevertheless an important one 
for SME financing, as it goes hand to hand with the use 
of the unquatifiable information that is needed to build 
long term relationship between banks and SMEs. As for-
mer Soviet economies suffer from general distrust, one 
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can expect that it is a factor hindering access to finance 
and economic cooperation.
Finally, the cultural base of what was Georgia’s sec-
ond economy under the Soviet regime, with its insis-
tence on honor and trust and which encouraged risk 
taking behavior (Mars and Altman, 1983), influences 
the entrepreneurship dynamic of the Georgian economy. 
It is an example of the kind of entrepreneurial resources 
or barriers that the usual approaches used by interna-
tional organizations fail to convey.
Systemic constraints: SMEs in Georgia perceive the 
existence of a “ceiling” to growth. There are many more 
business associations representing big companies than 
SMEs and big firms are better positioned to lobby their 
interests with government officials. As mentioned above, 
big companies are able to profit more from a simplified 
business environment, which makes SMEs feel that the 
playing field is biased in favor of large firms. The “ceiling” 
perception is accentuated by the ties between govern-
ment and big businesses. The interviews we conducted 
revealed that some SMEs have the impression that they 
are allowed to grow only up to a certain point, beyond 
which further expansion becomes problematic. Despite 
the seemingly neoliberal orientation of the government, 
it recently has taken decisions that contradict liberal 
principles: It reinforced both the National Bank and the 
Tax Department with the ability to extract and gather 
financial information about businesses. This very intru-
sive move on the part of the government is expected to 
have repercussions on investments and was designed to 
bolster the government’s position before the Fall 2012 
parliamentary elections.
Social constraints: The lack of managerial staff, pro-
fessional accountants and financial managers is also con-
sidered a limit to growth. Banks generally do not trust 
a firm’s accountants and examine their books directly, 
thus helping SMEs with financial statements. The avail-
ability of managerial resources is particularly important 
if entrepreneurial activity is expected to be a regular eco-
nomic activity. The notion of an enterprise, in its Western 
conception, supposes stable, repetitive activity. One-shot 
deals can be the expression of “entrepreneurial spirit”, but 
do not necessarily create “enterprises”. The availability of 
high-skilled labor is an important resource required for 
Georgia to evolve from “entrepreneurship” to enterprise.
Conclusion
In light of the labor and enterprise statistics presented 
here, the controversial uses of the EDBI described above, 
and the institutional problems Georgia faces, conclud-
ing that the country is an example of market liberalism 
seems a bit hasty. The famous EDBI kept the historical, 
institutional and social contexts (maybe even the eco-
nomical) out of the picture. Georgia has indeed made 
huge progress since the Rose Revolution, but property 
rights are still not respected. The fact that half of the 
work force is self-employed does not mean that “entre-
preneurship” suddenly emerged, for it might well mir-
ror the necessity of survival. The over-optimistic adver-
tising campaign Georgia pursued in recent years reflects 
the complexity of building market economies.
How can market institutions emerge from the 
old, rotten socio-economic tissue? Foreign investment 
becomes a crucial element for countries with very lim-
ited resources like Georgia to get out of the “virtual econ-
omy” (Gaddy and Ickes, 1999), the ugly cross-breed of 
the two systems, as Yeltsin put it. Multinational com-
panies with their international capital, know-how and 
best practices can transfer knowledge to Georgia that 
would indeed help Georgia develop from the top–down. 
But do entrepreneurs come from the observed or unob-
served part of the economy? Is the self-employed seg-
ment of the Georgian economy a stumbling block or a 
building block for economic development? How does 
one go from a social transformation to “entrepreneur-
ship”? These questions refer to the possible option of a 
bottom-up rescue out of the economic purgatory that 
some transition countries are in.
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DATA
Structure of the Georgian Private Enterprises Sector, 2010
Table 1: Firm Population
Number of registered enterprises (thousands) 321.20
Number of active enterprises 42.530
% of registered firm 13.2%
Small firm, as % of total registered 88%
Medium firm, as % of total registered 8%
Large firm, as % of total registered 4%
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
Table 2: Firm Performance
Firm contribution to GDP, mln. GEL 6,703.20
As % of GDP 32%
Contribution of SMEs to GDP generated by private sector 19%
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
Figure 1: Performance of the Private Sector (Value Added By Enterprise Size in Mln. GEL)
small 
485.10 
7% 
medium 
809.80 
12% 
large 
5,408.30 
81% 
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
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Table 3: Employment in the Private Sector By Size of Firm
Small (thousands) 81.508
Medium 91.943
Large 224.354
Employment generated by SMEs as % of total employment of private sector 43%
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
Figure 2: Turnover by Region
Tbilisi 
73% 
Rest 
27% 
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
Figure 3: Employment in the Private Sector By Size of Firm (Thousands)
Small 
81.508 
21% 
Medium 
91.943 
23% 
Large 
224.354 
56% 
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
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Value Added By Type of Economic Activity
Table 1: Value Added of the Enterprise Sector, Mln GEL
Agriculture, hunting and forestry and fishing 39.2
Industry 1,914.5
Construction 618.1
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and personal and 
household goods
1,421.8
Hotel and restaurants 149.9
Transport and communication 1,393.3
Real estate, renting and business activities 517.9
Education 88.9
Health and social work 351.9
Community, social and personal service activity 207.7
Total 6,703.2
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
Figure 1: Distribution of the Type of Activity of Enterprises
Industry  
29% 
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and personal 
and household 
goods 
21% 
Transport and 
communication 
21% 
rest 
29% 
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat
Table 2: GDP Structure 2010, Mln. GEL
Business sector 6,703.0 32%
Remittances 1,244.0 6%
Foreign aid 2009* 1,852.9 9%
FDI 1,629.0 7%
Government expenses 5,480.3 26%
Self employed 3834.18 18%
Total 20,743.4 100%
Compiled by Philippe Rudaz; source of data: Geostat, except for: * OECD aid flow database, http://www.aidflows.org; GEL/USD rate 
used 2
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Entrepreneurship in Armenia
By Hrant Mikaelian, Yerevan
Abstract
The Armenian economy is mostly private and is characterized by a strong big business sector. But despite 
common perceptions, the share of small and medium-sized enterprises in the economy is growing. Key obsta-
cles for Armenia’s small businesses are corruption, lack of protection for investments and property, and the 
complexity of the tax administration.
Background
In the Soviet Union, the entire economy was state owned. 
However, before it seceded from the USSR, Armenia 
started to create a private economy. On November 30, 
1990 the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Arme-
nia adopted a decision “On the privatization of both 
industrial and non-industrial objects” which marked 
the beginning of the large-scale privatization of state 
property. The privatization of land and its distribution 
among the peasants began in March 1991.
Privatization proceeded quickly and if at the end of 
1990 only 11.7% of the GDP of the country was car-
ried out by private enterprise, in a year, this propor-
tion had increased to 32.7%, and by 1998 comprised 
74.5% of the entire economy1. Privatization was practi-
cally complete by 2004, when the share of the private 
sector reached 84% of the economy. It has not grown 
since then2, while the number of state companies is only 
0.7% of all registered firms3.
By 1998, industry, transport and public services still 
were not fully privatized, while such micro-business as 
retail traders and small farms were totally private. For 
comparison, in many other former Soviet republics, the 
share of the public sector in the economy was much 
higher. In Georgia, the main privatization took place 
in 2005–2008 and in Russia many large enterprises are 
still owned by the state.
However, since privatization in Armenia was not 
planned properly and was carried out by the transfer 
of vouchers for public property to the population, the 
result has been that the state received almost nothing 
1 Peculiarities and Stages of Economic Reforms In Armenia 1991–
1998, National Statistical Service of Armenia, p. 4. armstat.am/
file/article/tntbar_91-98eng_1.pdf
2 Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Development National 
Center of Armenia, SME in figures smednc.am/?laid=1&com=m
odule&module=menu&id=189
3 Firms with private domestic ownership make up 89.9% of all 
firms, firms with private foreign ownership: 7.7%; with state 
ownership: 0.7%. See WB, IFC Enterprise Surveys Website, 
Rev. 7, 2011. Running a Business in Armenia www.enterprise 
surveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Coun 
try%20Notes/Armenia-09.pdf
from privatization;4 at the beginning of the privatiza-
tion process, state property holdings were estimated at 
20–40 billion dollars.5 Another consequence of priva-
tization was the growing polarization in society: by the 
early 1990s, the majority of the population being in 
extreme poverty6 preferred to sell their vouchers, which 
were quickly concentrated in the hands of a small group 
of individuals. First, they privatized all objects associ-
ated with the food industry and trade. At the same time, 
many heavy industrial plants were closed and for the first 
time in Armenia, large-scale industry was concentrated.
In 1990, industry and construction, two spheres 
of the economy which were dominated by large enter-
prises, made up 54.6% of GDP. By 2000, this num-
ber fell to 38.4% of GDP and to only 35.4% of GDP 
in 2010.7 Accordingly, the major enterprises lost their 
share in Armenia’s economy. By contrast, the agricul-
tural sectors, as well as retail and service sectors have 
been developing. And if in the area of trade Armenia 
has several large retail chains, small and medium busi-
nesses dominate much of the services sector and most 
of the agricultural sector.
Large Enterprises in Armenia
A new phenomenon for the Armenian economy has 
been the emergence of influential owners in the late 
1990s; they have mastered the former state-owned 
enterprises or occupied dominant positions in foreign 
trade. In public discourse, they are called “oligarchs” 
4 Foreign direct investment to the Armenian economy during 
1992–1996 totaled only $54.4 mln.
5 See Oleg Gasparyan. Armenian experience in mass privatization 
(Rus.), Central Asia and Caucasus #2, 1999 ca-c.org/journal/cac-
02-1999/st_09_gasparjan.shtml
6 In 1992, GDP per capita in Armenia was only $87.8, making 
Armenia one of the poorest societies in the world. See Peculiar-
ities and Stages of Economic Reforms In Armenia 1991–1998, 
National Statistical Service of Armenia, p. 3. armstat.am/file/arti 
cle/tntbar_91-98eng_1.pdf
7 Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2011 p. 581 armstat.am/file/
doc/99466733.pdf
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and often demonized,8 often with the use of leftist or 
“green” rhetoric9.
Initially in the privatization process, the largest and 
most profitable trading enterprises were taken by the 
combatants who returned from the Karabakh war and 
filled many high level government positions. Later the 
most successful merchants joined this class and gradu-
ally forced the former soldiers out of their government 
positions and partly out of the economy.
The new class of influential owners that rose in the 
late 1990s–early 2000s became a kind of a corpora-
tion and its representatives jointly entered high-level 
state positions, where they were well represented.10 They 
achieved the greatest representation in the parliament 
elected in 2007; according to the opposition they gained 
76 seats out of 131.11
Soviet Armenia was an industrialized republic that 
manufactured high-tech products. However, much of 
the production belonged to the military industry, and 
the enterprises of Armenia produced an estimated 40% 
of the total output of the USSR military electronics12. 
Since the industry did not adapt to the needs of the 
peacetime economy, it simply stopped working.
What are the major enterprises in Armenia today?
According to the 2011 ranking of the largest taxpayers, 
most of the top ten companies are natural monopolies. 
In addition, among the largest companies are distri-
bution networks, telecommunication companies, and 
companies involved in the sales or import of essential 
goods. Another important feature of the largest com-
panies is that most of them partially or totally repre-
sent foreign capital.13
First place in the list belongs to the Zangezur copper-
molybdenum plant, representing the mining industry. It 
8 For ex. see Hakob Badalyan. How Oligarchy Wastes Armenia. 
Mar. 23, 2012. Lragir.am lragir.am/engsrc/comments25555.html
9 “However, observers believe for the city authorities, which defend 
the interests of private property to the detriment of municipal 
green space, as many say, it has become a matter of principle, 
and they are unlikely to give up.” Naira Hayrumyan. Experts: 
Armenian oligarchy’s fate at stake in Mashtots Park. Apr. 2, 2012. 
ArmeniaNow.com armenianow.com/society/environment/37004/
yerevan_mashtots_park_pavilions_dismantling
10 Alexander Iskandaryan. Armenia between autocracy and polyar-
chy (Rus.), Pro Et Contra, #3–4, 2011. Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace Moscow Centre carnegieendowment.org/
files/ProetContra_52_19-28.pdf
11 Arshaluys Mghdesyan. General Elections in Armenia: Oligarchs 
will be replaced by their representatives? (Rus.) Nov. 30, 2011 
Regnum.ru regnum.ru/news/1472984.html
12 See Military Industry of Armenia. (Rus.) Military Caucasus mil 
kavkaz.net/?q=node/94
13 See the full list here: express.am/taxes/taxes7.pdf (Arm.)
provides 3.5% of all taxes14 and has a significant share in 
the country’s exports. In second place is “ArmRosGaz-
prom”, which provides gas supply and distribution across 
the country’s pipeline network. In third place is the tele-
communication company “K-Telecom”, fourth is “Alex 
Grig” primarily engaged in importing, fifth: “Armenia 
Telecom Company”, representing the telecommunica-
tions sector, sixth is “City Petrol Group”, seventh: “Elec-
tric networks of Armenia”, eighth: “Flash”, which sells 
gasoline, ninth is the “International Airport of Armenia”, 
and in tenth place is the construction company “HAEK”.
The industrial sector today consists of the mining 
industry, electricity production, and light industry 
(mostly food production). Big business is well repre-
sented in the mining and energy sector, while the food 
industry is diversified. As of 2010, large businesses made 
up 57% of GDP in Armenia15.
Small and Medium Enterprises in Armenia
Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan and President Serzh 
Sargsyan have repeatedly made  statements about the 
need to support small and medium enterprises in Arme-
nia.16 There is a wide spread perception that big busi-
ness poses a danger to Armenia through the ongoing 
concentration and monopolization of the economy. In 
fact, data do not confirm the thesis that the economy is 
increasingly being monopolized. During all recent years, 
small and medium enterprises have increased their pres-
ence in the economy.
By contrast, in Georgia, there is an ongoing con-
solidation among businesses and the share of SMEs is 
declining: In 2000, small and medium enterprises made 
33% of GDP17, in 2003: 29.4%18, and by 2010 this figure 
had dropped to 15%. Small and medium enterprises in 
2011 amounted to 16.5% in the total turnover of busi-
ness in Georgia, showing a permanent decline during the 
last decade, with the exception of the crisis year 200919.
14 For more detailed information on Armenian state budget and tax 
income, see Socio-Economic Situation of RA, January–Decem-
ber 2011, p. 104 (Arm.) National Statistical Service of Armenia, 
armstat.am/file/article/sv_12_11a_211.pdf
15 SME share totals 43% of Armenia’s GDP. Sep. 14, 2011. Pan-
Armenian.net panarmenian.net/eng/news/78037/
16 See for example: Serzh Sargsyan at the 13th Republican Conven-
tion. Mar. 10, 2012 A1Plus.am a1plus.am/en/official/2012/03/10/
president; PM Answers Questions of Interest to Political Ana-
lysts, Journalists. Jun. 6, 2012 gov.am/en/interviews/1/item/3200/
17 Vladimir Khikhadze. Small business loses its share in Economy. 
(Geo) Mar. 12, 2012 Banks and Finances bfm.ge/banks/3642-..html
18 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Caucasian Coun-
tries in Transition. Experience in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia. p. 9 UNITED NATIONS. New York and Geneva, 2006 
erenet.org/country/unece_cau.pdf
19 Production Value By Enterprise Size. National Statistics Office of 
Georgia geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/business/by%20
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In Armenia, the methodology for determining the 
size of the business differs from that in Georgia: if in 
Georgia enterprise size is determined by its turnover, 
in Armenia it is determined by the number of people 
employed. In all spheres the micro-enterprises are con-
sidered those that employ up to 5 people. Small enter-
prises in industry are considered those that employ up 
to 50 people, in education and energy: up to 25 people, 
and in transport, trade, services, etc.: up to 25 people. 
Medium industry enterprises in Armenia are those that 
employ up to 100 people, education and energy: up to 
50 people and services: up to 30 people. All others are 
considered large.20
Tables 1 and 2 on p. 14 present data on small and 
medium enterprises in Armenia.
As we can see, each year more than 10,000 new small 
and medium enterprises are registered as opposed to 
200 to 400 new large companies. Most companies are 
now registered as SMEs and the statistics for the first 
six months of 2012 show that there are 6,047 newly 
registered individual entrepreneurs, 1,479 limited lia-
bility companies and 54 joint-stock companies (both 
open and closed).21
Thus, we see that the small and medium businesses 
are gradually increasing their share in the economy and 
Armenia is ahead of many countries in the region, includ-
ing Azerbaijan (15%), Bulgaria (33.3%), Moldova (28.9%) 
and even Greece (27%)22, but is behind more developed 
countries, where SMEs make up nearly 50% of GDP.23
It is worth mentioning that compared with the domes-
tic market, the presence of SMEs in international trade is 
significantly lower: SMEs share of exports is 18%, while 
its share of imports in recent years fluctuated around 
35–38%, and in the crisis year fell to 26.2%. However, 
Armenia is not unique in this regard. In the Netherlands, 
size%20of%20enterprises/production%20value.xls
20 Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Sector in Armenia 
2007–2009, p.5. Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Devel-
opment National Center of Armenia. smednc.am/download.
php?f=1252&fc=REFERENCE%202007-2009%20english.pdf
21 According to Socio-Economic Situation of RA, January–Febru-
ary… January–July, 2012. National Statistical Service of Armenia.
22 Dr. Antal Szabó. Development of entrepreneurship and SME 
sector in the BSECRegion. ERENET Profile. ISSUE Vol. VI No. 
4, p. 15. Oct.2011, UN. erenet.org/publications/profile24.pdf. It 
should be noted that the methodology used for counting SMEs 
in GDP for Albania and Romania differs from others. While 
Albania shows 70% SME share in GDP, there are only 21.8% 
employed in SME (See Erenet issue Vol. VII No 2. May, 2012. 
erenet.org/publications/profile26.pdf)
23 For more details, see: Meghana Ayyagari, Thorsten Beck, and Asli 
Demirgüç-Kunt. Small and Medium Enterprises across the Globe: 
A New Database, p. 22. Aug. 2003. World Bank www-wds.world-
bank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/30/000
094946_0309160409277/additional/106506322_20041117160012.pdf
where the SME’s share in GDP is 50%, SMEs provide 
only 27% of overall imports and 19% of exports.24
Another reason for the low level of SMEs in inter-
national trade is the high cost of cargo transportation, 
especially taking into account Armenia’s landlocked 
position and the transport blockade.25 The export of one 
container costs in average of $1,815 ($1,595 for Georgia, 
$1,153 for Greece), and the import of one container costs 
about $2,195 ($1,715 for Georgia, $1,265 for Greece).26 
The decline in the share of SMEs in imports in 2009 
was due to a rise in the price of transportation costs by 
44% in 2009, which imposed too heavy a burden for 
the small and medium-sized importers.
Armenian Businessmen’s Reaction to the 
Crisis
Before the crisis, Armenia’s economy has been grow-
ing rapidly due to favorable external conditions: inflow 
of foreign currency, the growth of foreign markets and 
domestic demand. After the recession the recovery in 
Armenia has been slow. GDP fell 14.1% in 2009, while 
it grew only 2.2% in 2010 and 4.7% in 2011,27 the 
Armenian economy is still far from making a full recov-
ery whereas the economy of Georgia has recovered and 
exceeded pre-crisis levels.28
In 2009, exports decreased by 30%. Private trans-
fers, which financed household consumption and the 
construction sector, fell by the same amount. In this sit-
uation, most companies were able to survive but faced 
reduced turnover.
Therefore, Armenia has also been able to avoid large-
scale layoffs: in 2009 employment dropped by about 4%, 
but most of them were at non-permanent jobs. As for 
full-time jobs, in some cases, salaries were cut, but lay-
offs mostly were avoided.29
24 Moritz Roth. SMEs in the Netherlands. Making a difference, 
April 13, 2011 p.5. Deutsche Bank Research. dbresearch.com/
PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000271742/SMEs+in
+the+Netherlands%3A+Making+a+difference.PDF
25 Even before gaining independence, Armenia faced blockade from 
Azerbaijan and since gaining independence also from the Turk-
ish side. Thus, 84% of officially recognized borders of Armenia, 
or 1050 km., are blocked.
26 Country Profile: Armenia, p. 12. Doing Business. World Bank, 
International Finance Corporation doingbusiness.org/~/media/
fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/ARM.pdf
27 See Gross Domestic Product at market prices, Time Series. Arme-
nian National Statistical Service armstat.am/en/?nid=126&id=01001
28 In 2009, decline consisted 3.8%, while in 2010 GDP grew by 
6.3% and in 2011 by 7.0%. See Gross Domestic Product of Geor-
gia in 2011. National Statistics Office of Georgia geostat.ge/cms/
site_images/_files/english/nad/GDP_2011__press-release__Eng1.pdf
29 According to Socio-Economic Situation of RA, January–Decem-
ber, 2011, p. 88 (Arm.) National Statistical Service of Armenia 
armstat.am/file/article/sv_12_10a_141.pdf
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However, despite the significant decline in foreign 
trade, local businesses partially reoriented to meet domes-
tic demand, which decreased less than foreign trade. Dur-
ing the crisis in 2009 about 90% of production by enter-
prises was sold in Armenia, and only 10% exported.30
Each sector performed differently. The first shock 
hit industry and construction, while agriculture, trade 
and services showed smaller declines. The most dra-
matic reduction came in construction, which is heavily 
dependent on foreign transfers made by diaspora Arme-
nians. As the crisis in Armenia’s construction began later 
than in the U.S., at some point, real estate purchased by 
American-Armenians in Yerevan, had comparable prices 
as in California. As a result, many American-Arme-
nians have sold their property in Armenia and bought 
real estate in the U.S., which they could not afford ear-
lier. Prices in the real estate market fell, with a negative 
impact on the construction sector and the Armenian 
currency exchange rate.
The weakening of large enterprises has led to the fact 
that small and medium enterprises in 2009 amounted 
to 30.6% of total industrial production (comparing to 
22.3% in 2008), a similar situation took place in the 
transport sector, where the share of SMEs increased by 
7.2% and reached 28%.
On the other hand, in construction, the most 
affected sector during the crisis, the share of SMEs 
dropped since many small construction firms went out 
of business because of the increased competition while 
those that remained saw their income decline. Another 
consequence of the crisis was the closure of many small 
companies, which previously had operated in the shad-
ows. The crisis has forced the government to seek new 
sources of revenue for the treasury and has required 
these firms to pay taxes. These companies were located 
mostly in the poorer regions of Armenia.
Business Environment in Armenia
According to the Index of Economic Freedom prepared 
by the Heritage Foundation, the Armenian economy is 
“moderately free” and close to being ranked “mostly free,” 
taking 39th place in the world, ahead of several advanced 
economies. On most of the technical indicators, Armenia 
shows good or very good results: for example, a high score 
in business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, 
trade freedom, fiscal freedom, etc. However, estimates 
in the rule of law section, such as the protection of prop-
erty rights and freedom from corruption, are very low.
30 See WB, IFC Enterprise Surveys Website, Rev. 7, 2011. Running 
a Business in Armenia, p. 4 enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/
EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Country%20Notes/Armenia-09.pdf
According to another report, the World Bank Ease of 
Doing Business Index 2011/2012, Armenia held the 55th 
position and with five reforms implemented in 2011 is 
one of the leaders in carrying out reform.31 Since Arme-
nia is suffering from a lack of investment, the govern-
ment is trying to fix the business environment in order 
to attract potential investors. As one of the five reforms 
in 2011, Armenia made starting business easier by estab-
lishing a one-stop shop that merged the procedures for 
name reservation, business registration and obtaining 
a tax identification number and by allowing for online 
company registration.32 Thus, the business environment 
in Armenia is gradually improving.
Despite the majority of good results, Armenia 
showed one of the worst results in tax administration, 
taking 153th place in the world. The main tax rates are 
not very high. Thus, the income tax in Armenia ranges 
from 10 to 20%, while in Austria it spans from 36.5% to 
50%.33 In this case, there is a public inquiry to increase 
the upper limit of taxes for large enterprises and use a 
progressive tax.34 But despite the comparatively low tax 
rate and some improvements in the administration of its 
payment, it is still a problem: the businessman in Arme-
nia has to make 34 payments and spend 500 hours on 
paying taxes each year.35 This complexity increases the 
risk of corruption in the tax area and poses a problem 
for small and micro enterprises.
According to many SME representatives, large busi-
ness is in a privileged position in the tax sphere and that is 
how they explain why a large proportion of SMEs operate 
in the shadows. Partially, in the shade are big businesses 
that seek ways to split up their businesses to get tax ben-
efits. For this reason the tax collection rate remains low 
and amounts to 17% of GDP, excluding social security 
contributions. However, in late 2011, the Government of 
31 See Doing Business Report 2011–2012, p. 6. WB, IFC. doingbusi-
ness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB12-FullReport.pdf
32 Country Profile: Armenia, p. 20. Doing Business. World Bank, 
International Finance Corporation doingbusiness.org/~/media/
fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/ARM.pdf
33 See Georgia: Selected Issues, p. 39. Apr. 2011, International 
Monetary Fund www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1193.pdf
34 According to Caucasus Institute Parties Pre-election Promises, 
this promise was one of the most common and was made by 
practically all parties, including members of ruling coalition. 
See: Nina Iskandaryan, Hrant Mikaelian, Tatev Sargsyan. Par-
ties Pre-Election Promises. c-i.am/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/
brief-prefinal.pdf (Rus)
35 Country Profile: Armenia, p. 70. Doing Business. World Bank, 
International Finance Corporation doingbusiness.org/~/media/
fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/ARM.pdf
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Armenia developed a package of reforms aimed at equal-
izing the conditions for SMEs and large companies.36
Among other results, it is worth mentioning insuf-
ficient level of protecting investors, in which Armenia 
takes the 97th place in the world. Thus, the three major 
problems affecting Armenia’s ratings are corruption, lack 
of protection for investments and property, and the com-
plexity of the tax administration.
Corruption
The topic of corruption deserves detailed attention. The 
fact is that the assessment of corruption embedded in 
the Index of Economic Freedom is a reflection of Arme-
nia’s Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion Index. Armenia ranks low in this index, earning 
2.6 points out of a possible 10, which shows a deterio-
ration since 2005. Is the corruption environment wors-
ening in Armenia?
According to the Transparency International Global 
Corruption Barometer 2009, 22% of respondents in 
Armenia reported that one of their household members 
paid a bribe in the past 12 months. According to the 
results of Global Corruption Barometer 2010/2011, this 
number improved to 19.4%. Certainly, this is not the 
only measure to estimate bribery and corruption, but it 
makes it possible to compare with different countries. 
As we see in Table 3 on p. 15, among the many coun-
tries there is no direct correlation between the percep-
tion of corruption and how often people give bribes.
Thus, we see the contrast between the dynamics of 
perceived corruption and its actual physically measured 
indicator as a proportion of those who gave a bribe in 
the past year in the population.
Other studies show similar results. For example, 
according to the EBRD 2005 Transition Report, Arme-
nia showed one of the best results in the EBRD region in 
terms of freedom from corruption and was only slightly 
lower than those of Georgia and a number of Central 
European countries (but better than most of the Bal-
kan and Eastern European states), showing improve-
ments from 2002.37
Later surveys conducted by the CRRC (Caucasus 
Barometer) likewise tell the same story.38 The willing-
ness of the Armenian businessmen to pay bribes is sig-
nificantly lower than the average for the countries of 
36 Sara Khojoyan. Armenia Prepares for Major Tax Reform. Nov. 11, 
2011. Institute for war and peace reporting iwpr.net/report-news/
armenia-prepares-major-tax-reform
37 Transition Report 2005. Business in Transition, p. 13. EBRD. 
ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/TR05.pdf
38 According to CRRC polls, 9% of respondents reported one of 
household members paying bribe during last 12 months in 2008. 
By November, 2011 this number had decreased to 6%.
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and slightly higher 
than those in Western Europe. Also, the level of losses 
due to theft, robbery, vandalism, and arson is very low.39
Private Initiative
It seems that the problem of post-crisis recovery is also 
subjective. According to the EBRD 2011 Transition 
Report, successful business startups comprised less than 
4% of the total population, which is the worst result of 
all transit countries and only a quarter the rate of major 
EU member states.40
Thus, Armenia is facing a shortage of private initia-
tive, which is probably the main factor hindering the 
development of SMEs. This problem is common within 
most successor states of the former Soviet Union41, but 
in Armenia it seems to be more acute.
A survey conducted by CRRC in November 2011 
shows that 57% of people find it necessary to increase 
the share of government in the economy, and only 18% 
insist on continuation of the economic liberalization.42 
Such paternalistic attitudes among the population have 
a negative impact on willingness to open a business and 
reduce the level of private initiative. Another obstacle to 
entrepreneurism is the high level of distrust in the govern-
ment and the perceived level of corruption, which causes 
people to rate their chances of success very low. This cir-
cumstance is an important motivator for emigration, the 
rate of which is high in Armenia and was about 8–15‰ 
per year during 2008–2011.43 Therefore, many who plan 
to emigrate in near future postpone the decision to start 
a business in order to realize it in another country.
Women are able to give new impulse to the develop-
ment of entrepreneurship in Armenia. In recent years, 
women in Armenia began to show more initiative than 
before. According to the World Development Indicators 
& Global Development Finance database, in 2005 only 
11.5% of firms had female participation in ownership 
while in 2009 they made up already 31.8% of all firms.44
39 See WB, IFC Enterprise Surveys Website, Rev. 7, 2011. p. 5. Run-
ning a Business in Armenia enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/
EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Country%20Notes/Armenia-09.pdf
40 Transition Report 2011. Crisis and Transition. P. 78. EBRD 
ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/tr11.pdf
41 Compare CIS and other regions results in table “If someone wants 
to start a business in this country, can they trust the government to 
allow their business to make a lot money?” Latin Americans See 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship. Oct. 22, 2010. Gallup. gallup.com/
poll/143966/Latin-Americans-Barriers-Entrepreneurship.aspx
42 See Caucasus Barometer 2011
43 According to State Migration Service of Ministry of Territorial 
Administration of Armenia, 43,800 people emigrated only in 
2011. For detailed statistics visit smsmta.am.
44 World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance 
database in Excel format can be downloaded here: databank.
worldbank.org/databank/download/WDIandGDF_excel.zip.
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In conclusion, the perceived high level of corruption 
and other barriers to business is becoming a significant 
factor hindering the development of SMEs in Armenia. 
Despite the desire among large companies to achieve a 
greater presence in the markets, small and medium busi-
nesses are gradually increasing their share in Armenia’s 
economy and now have reached the level of Central and 
Eastern Europe, i.e., 43% of GDP.
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DATA
Table 1:  SME Participation in the Economy of Armenia
SME, 
share in 
GDP*
Share of SME 
employees in total 
number of employed 
people
Total number of 
registered
SMEs during the 
year
Share of obligatory 
social security pay-
ments paid by SMEs 
as a % of the total of 
the obligatory social 
security payments
Share of taxes paid 
by SMEs as a % of 
the total amount 
of taxes paid in 
Armenia
2002 34.4 28.2
2003 36.5 31.0 8,295
2004 38.6 32.9 8,889 33.0 28.3
2005 39.8 34.0 9,445 33.9 27.9
2006 40.3 35.1 10,082 35.0 27.7
2007 41.0 40.7 12,535 45.7 25.2
2008 41.7 42.1 20,952 50.9 28.0
2009 42.5 42.2 14,023 48.7 26.8
2010 43.0
* Non-financial GDP, except agriculture
Sources: Reference Book. Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Sphere in Armenia 2003–2004, p. 8. Yerevan, 2005; Reference Book. 
Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Sphere in Armenia 2005–2006, p. 45. Yerevan, 2007 (in Armenian); Reference Book. Small 
and Medium Entrepreneurship Sector in Armenia 2006–2008, p. 14. Yerevan, 2009; Reference Book. Small and Medium Entrepre-
neurship Sector in Armenia 2006–2008, p. 9. Yerevan, 2010; SME share totals 43% of Armenia’s GDP panarmenian.net/eng/news/78037/
Table 2: International Activities of SME
The share of foreign investments made in SMEs as a 
% of overall FDI
Shares of SMEs in 
export
Shares of SMEs in 
import
2003 14.3 31.6
2004 9.1 15.7 34.8
2005 10.4 16.4 36.3
2006 9.5 16.9 36.8
2007 8.8 17.4 37.3
2008 8.2 17.9 37.8
2009 8.0 17.7 26.2
2010 18.0
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Table 3: Corruption in Armenia Compared to Central and Eastern European Countries
CPI-
2011
In past 3 years, the 
level of corruption in 
country has
GCB-2010/2011, % of who reported 
one of household members paying 
bribe during the last 12 months
GCB-2010/2011, 
% who reported 
not paying bribe
Decreased 
(%)
Increased 
(%)
to speed things up to avoid problems 
with authori-
ties or to receive 
entitled service 
Armenia 2.6 15 50 7.4% 12.0% 74.5%
Azerbaijan 2.4 28 52 12.4% 26.9% 33.7%
Georgia 4.1 78 9 0.2% 1.2% 58.4%
Ukraine 2.3 7 30 11.9% 13.1% 57.8%
Moldova 2.9 12 53 13.8% 14.2% 65.1%
Hungary 4.6 4 76 5.7% 16.8% 69.6%
Poland 5.5 26 49 3.1% 3.8% 92.3%
Czech Rep. 4.4 14 44 4.9% 6.0% 88.1%
Romania 3.6 2 87 7.1% 10.5% 76.7%
Bulgaria 3.3 28 30 1.6% 5.0% 82.4%
Turkey 4.2 26 57 3.1% 4.2% 69.9%
Serbia 3.3 14 49 6.0% 8.6% 60.2%
Croatia 4.0 10 57 2.2% 2.5% 53.5%
Greece 3.4 5 75 6.1% 9.5% 81.9%
Italy 3.9 5 65 1.5% 4.3% 86.2%
Austria 7.8 9 46 1.8% 1.5% 95.5%
Sources: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 (CPI); Transparency International, Global Corruption Barom-
eter (GCB) 2010–2011
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Figure 1: Corruption Perceptions Index 2011
Higher index – less corruption
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011
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Compiled by Lili Di Puppo
For the full chronicle since 2009 see www.laender-analysen.de/cad
From 23 November to 10 December 2012
23 November 2012 An advisory commission in Mexico City recommends the removal of a public statue of the late 
Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev 
26 November 2012 EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton visits Georgia and meets with Georgian President 
Mikheil Saakashvili and Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili to discuss EU–Georgia 
relations before a visit to Central Asia 
26 November 2012 The Georgian Ministry of Defence says that Defence Minister Irakli Alasania is on an official 
visit in Afghanistan to meet with Georgian troops serving under the NATO-led ISAF mission 
28 November 2012 The new Georgian Interior Minister Irakli Garibashvili says that the crime situation in the coun-
try is not deteriorating following the change of government in November 2012
29 November 2012 Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov visits Armenia and holds talks with Arme-
nian President Serzh Sarkisian on trade and energy issues
30 November 2012 The Georgian prosecutor’s office says that the former chief of police in the Georgian town of Bor-
jomi is arrested for the alleged abuse of a detainee
4 December 2012 Four Azerbaijani citizens are sentenced for terrorism and high treason in Azerbaijan’s capital of 
Baku after they are found guilty of preparing attacks on the eve of the Eurovision Song Contest 
in Baku and of having links with members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps
4 December 2012 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen says that Georgia has passed an important 
test with the parliamentary elections of November 2012, but speaks of the necessity of a “smooth 
cohabitation” between Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and the new government 
6 December 2012 The Georgian Ministry of Defence says that its internal investigations unit has found evidence of 
corrupt schemes in arms procurements made at the time when Bacho Akhalaia served as Defence 
Minister
6 December 2012 Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili meets with Polish President Bronisław Komorowski in 
Warsaw to discuss the deepening of bilateral relations between the two countries as well as recent 
internal developments in Georgia
7 December 2012 The Georgian Parliament passes a draft law on amnesty in its first reading that envisages different 
forms of amnesty for Georgian prisoners
7 December 2012 Former Georgian Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili is summoned to answer questions regarding 
the alleged use of a fake passport by the investigative unit of the Interior Ministry
8 December 2012 The Georgian Interior Ministry says that a former officer of the Interior Ministry’s Department 
for Constitutional Security who is wanted in Georgia on charges of allegedly beating up police 
officers was arrested in Kiev on 7 December 2012
9 December 2012 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says that contacts are planned with the Georgian Prime 
Minister’s Special Representative for Relations with Russia in the “nearest future” to clarify the 
“context” in which Tbilisi is willing to normalize its relations with Moscow
10 December 2012 The Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry says that an agreement with Russia to use the Qabala early-warning 
radar station expired on 9 December 2012 after Moscow had shown no interest in renewing the deal
10 December 2012 The Azerbaijani police disperses an unsanctioned gathering of opposition activists trying to mark 
Human Rights Day in a central Baku square
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